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I. Introduction

Game theory studies how people should respond in strategic situations and is
naturally used for predictive purposes. The optimal strategy predictions yielded by game
theoretic reasoning can be surprising when they conflict with preconceived notions of
how to play, i.e. the "common sense" strategy. Consequently, the game theoretically
optimal strategy may be a poor predictor of how individuals actually behave in real-life
strategic situations. In order to accurately model such situations for predictive purposes it
is important,to know the limitations of the current game theoretic tools.
In the traveler's dilemma, Kaushik Basu presents a parable to illustrate how game

theoretic reasoning and intuition can be at odds. The parable is as follows: Two travelers
are returning home from a vacation where they purchased identical souvenirs.
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These

souvenirs are, of course, routinely destroyed by the airline. The souvenirs were purchased
with cash in an open-air market and as a result the travelers do not have receipts. The
airline official in charge of damage claims wants to compensate the travelers fairly but
has no way of determining the actual purchase price of the souvenirs. In an attempt to
avoid spurious claims the official proposes a method to determine the amount awarded.
Each traveler must submit a claim that lies between a known minimum and maximum.
(The minimum bound can be thought of as that level of claim below which the airline
never disputes for cost reasons and the maximum bound can be thought of as the most the
airline' s insurance company would pay absent a special policy). If the claims submitted
are equal then both receive the amount claimed. However, if traveler 1 submits a lower

I Theoretically the travelers' relationship doesn't affect their incentives although empirically it may be
important.

claim than traveler 2, traveler I is considered "honest" and receives the lower claim plus
a reward for honesty (ideally in frequent flyer miles thereby ensuring that the airline will
have an opportunity to destroy those items which it missed on the first pass). Traveler 2
also receives the lower claim but in addition a symmetric penalty for "lying" is levied.
Travelers report their claims simultaneously i.e., without knowledge of the other
traveler's claim. This ensures that simple, collusive agreements cannot be reached
because any such agreement involves a non-credible promise (the rewards are structured
such that there it is never in a rational player's best interest to playas he agreed).
Game theoretic analysis suggests that two rational players will report the
minimum claim. Moreover, this result is a direct consequence of both players attempting
to maximize their individual payoff. Adoption of this strategy does not, on the face of it,
appear to be the best strategy because both players can clearly improve their payoff
simply by submitting random large claims.
Kaushik Basu proposed the traveler's dilemma to suggest that Nash equilibria
may fail to consistently predict behavior in certain situations. 2 The traveler's dilemma
presents a simple allegory that calls into question the predictive ability of Nash equilibria.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (a list of strategies) such that each player's
strategy maximizes the player's payoff, assuming that all other players adopt their Nash
equilibrium strategies. In other words, a Nash equilibrium strategy is a best response to
3

the belief that all other players will adopt their Nash equilibrium strategies. Nash

2 Basu, Kaushik. "The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory." American
Economic Review, May 1994, 84(2), pp. 391-394.
nd
3 Definition taken from Scott Bierman and Luis Fernandez, Game theory with Economic Applications. 2
Edition. Reading: Addison-Wesley-Longman Publishing Co., 1998.
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equilibrium strategies in this game can be found using the process of iterated deletion of
dominated strategies. This process is explained in detail below.
Although widely accepted as an analysis tool, this is not the first time the
predictive power of Nash equilibria has been questioned. The possibility of multiple
Nash equilibrium strategies in a given game coupled with the lack of an accepted
methodology for choosing the "best" among multiple Nash equilibria has long been
recognized as a limitation. 4 The traveler's dilemma, however, is a game with a unique
Nash equilibrium. Acceptance of Nash equilibrium predictions for games which have
single Nash equilibrium solutions has been considerably less controversial. The dilemma
stems from doubts that the equilibrium is intuitive. Basu states:
"But even knowing this, there is something very rational about rejecting (the Nash equilibrium)
and expecting your opponent to do the same ... The aim is to explain why, despite rationality being
common knowledge, players would reject (the Nash equilibrium), as intuitively seems to be the
case.,,5

Subsequent research by Monica Capra, Jacob Goree, et. al. has shown that the Nash
equilibrium prediction can indeed be a poor predictor of strategic play in the traveler's
dilemma.

II. Specification of the Problem

The traveler's dilemma can be formalized as follows. Let the range be the interval

U, k] (thus j and k are, respectively, the minimum and maximum allowed claims) and the
reward be R (by assumption the penalty is -R). Denote the claim chosen by traveler i as
nj and the payoff received by traveler i as Pj. The payoffs are:
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Min n l,n 2!+R if n2<n 1]

Min (n l,n2)+R if n l<n 2 ]
Pl= Min \nl,n~ i - R if ne n 2
[
n 1 If n l=n 2

p 2= Min ,n l' n

[

2'- R if n 2>n 1

n 2 If n l=n 2

The logic of the Nash equilibrium is as follows. Given that both travelers attempt
to maximize their compensation, suppose that both consider submitting the maximum
claim ({nl = k, n2

=k} and PI = P2 = k).

It is apparent that by submitting a slightly lower

claim (k - E) the first traveler can undercut the second traveler and earn the reward for
honesty, resulting in a payoff of PI

=(k - E + R) > k. 6 This is true because traveler 1 gives

up a small amount (E) but by undercutting traveler 2 he earns the reward (R). Reporting k
is never a best response to any report by traveler 2. This logic applies equally well to
traveler 2 and as a result we can conclude that neither will submit the maximum value.
Excluding the maximum from the set of best response strategies yields a truncated claim
spectrum [j, k - E]. The same argument can be repeated on this and all subsequent
maximum values. By using iterated deletion of dominated strategies the game unravels in
a manner similar to the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma7 with one important
difference. The finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma has a dominant strategy equilibrium
while traveler's dilemma does not.

4Focal point and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium have been recognized as standing out among multiple
Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately focal point equilibria are neither predictable nor "well defined" and
~areto-optimal equilibria do not always exist when multiple Nash equilibria are present.
, Ibid. I, pp.393 .
6 This only holds for R > E. If R:S; E then PI =(nl - E + R) :s; k and the Nash equilibrium is {nl = k, n2 = k}.
7 A finite series of sequentially repeated prisoner's dilemma games played by the same subjects.
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The traveler's dilemma is a generalization of the prisoner's dilemma under certain
conditions. 8 By definition, a prisoner's dilemma is a static, two-player game with perfect
information in which the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominated.
Consider the game if you restrict the set of possible claims to two distinct values (a and b,
where a < b). The new game is a prisoner's dilemma if R > b - a. When the game is
restricted to two distinct claim values it simplifies to a prisoner's dilemma if and only if
the reward is larger than the difference of the claims. For large enough values of R the
restricted game will always simplify to a prisoner's dilemma. If R < b - a then the game
has two Nash equilibrium of which {b, b} is Pareto-dominant.

Table I

Traveler 1

a
Traveler 2 a
b

Traveler 1

a

b
(a + R, a-R)
(b, b)

Traveler 2 a
b

(a, a)
(a - R, a + R)
a < b - R < b byassumptior

The process of iterated deletion of dominated strategies used to find the Nash
equilibrium in the traveler's dilemma seems quite similar to the process commonly used
in the finitely repeated prisoner' s dilemma; however, there is a critical difference. The
traveler's dilemma circumvents some philosophical criticisms leveled against Nash
equilibrium of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. 9 The fact that the traveler's
dilemma is free of this flaw is an important issue because this is precisely what allows the
predictive power of the Nash equilibrium to be rigorously tested. It is therefore important
to understand the philosophical criticism of the Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated

Ibid. I, pp. 392.
See for example Pettit, Philip and Sugden, Robert. "The Backward Induction Paradox." Journal of
Philosophy, April 1989,86(4), pp. 169-182.
8

9

5
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prisoner's dilemma and why the traveler's dilemma is not affected. Briefly, common
knowledge of rationality is assumed and then the final node of the game tree or the set of
actions available during the final round for the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is
examin~d.

Since there is no penalty incurred by defection ("defection" is cOIIlplonly used

to denote the individually selfish choice {a} versus "cooperation" towards the potentially
Pareto-dominant outcome {b, b}) it is assumed that rational players will defect in the last
round. The key issue is that the assumption of shared rationality in the final node is too
powerful, that is, it ignores the possibility that non-rational behavior has been
demonstrated in prior rounds.
There are many different paths to a final node in the finitely repeated prisoner's
dilemma and many are logically inconsistent with the assumption of common knowledge
of rationality in the final node. Only when examining end nodes that follow paths
wherein both players persistently defect does it make sense to assume common
knowledge of rationality. Consistent acts of cooperation will result in players being
unable to reach the Nash equilibrium strategy profile generated through backward
induction ({ always defect, always defect}) because they have to attribute rationality to the
other player despite evidence to the contrary. The Nash equilibrium in the traveler's
dilemma, a static game, is reached using the technique of iterated deletion of dominated
strategies and therefore does not involve attributing rationality at nodes that cannot be
reached under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. Consequently the
paradoxical nature of the Nash equilibrium in the traveler' s dilemma cannot be dismissed
on grounds of logical inconsistency.

6
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The Nash equilibrium in the traveler's dilemma is induced by the reward. That is,
a reward is both a necessary and a sufficient condition to drive the equilibrium to the
minimum claim value. In contrast, a penalty is not only unnecessary it is insufficient to
drive the equilibrium to the minimum. The best response to any belief about the other
traveler's claim, when there is only a penalty, is simply to match the other traveler' s
claim. The incentive to undercut no longer exists and multiple Nash equilibria of the
form {nJ = i, n2 = i}, i

E

[j, k], exist of which {nJ = k, n2 = k} is Pareto-dominant. In

contrast, the Nash equilibrium is unchanged if there is only a reward, and it remains
independent of the magnitude of that reward. This is easily verified using the same
technique used earlier when both penalty and reward were present.
Eliminating the penalty simplifies the traveler's dilemma to the minimum
conditions necessary to attain the result that Basu desired. Incidentally, it also clears up
one seeming inconsistency in the parable version of the traveler's dilemma. Is it
reasonable to assume that an airline can impose a penalty when it is responsible for
damages? I would argue that it is not, that it is more reasonable to assume that the airline
may try to induce low claims with a bribe. 10

III. Previous Experimental Evidence

Evidence of play inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium strategy has been
established experimentally by eG.

JJ

An experiment was designed to test whether the

magnitude of the penalty/reward had an effect on the average level of claims. Randomly

10 Unfortunately this slightly changes the static analysis of the restricted traveler's dilemma. Now nl
(seeTable I) is a weakly dominant strategy and {a, a} is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium.

7

=a

paired subjects were asked to choose a claim within the interval ($.80, $2.00). The
minimum claimant was punished and the maximum claimant was rewarded as previously
described. The penalty varied over a range of high, medium, and low values (R = {$.05,
$.10, $.20,$.25, $.50, $.80}). No mention of the allegory used by Basu was made in order
to avoid "halo" effects.
The experiment consisted of six sessions. Each session was divided into two
parts. Each part allowed ten rounds of playl2 at either a high or a low penalty/reward level
(every round used a different random pairing of players). The order in which subjects
were first exposed to a given penalty/reward parameter was reversed in subsequent
sessions (high, low to low, high and vice versa) to test for a sequence effect. A sequence
effect can be thought of as the momentum generated through previous experience. For
example, suppose subjects are familiar with a reward structure that induces low claims. If
the reward structure is suddenly changed such that it now induces high claims, ceteris

paribus, subjects have a tendency to submit lower claims than would otherwise be
expected. The opposite holds when the switch is from low to high. In any given round
subjects were only informed of the response given by the player with whom they had been
paired.
CG found that average claims were inversely related to the magnitude of the
penalty/reward. When the penalty/reward was sufficiently high (R

=$.50, $.80) play

converged to the Nash equilibrium. At low and medium penalty/reward levels average
claims were consistently above the Nash equilibrium level. Similarly, for low

11 Capra, Monica M., Goeree, Jacob K., et al. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?"
Unpublished, September 1997.
12 Part B of the first two sessions only allowed five rounds of play.
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penalty/reward levels the average claim was consistently above that for medium
penalty/reward levels. Significantly less variation occurred at low penalty/reward levels.
Evidence of a sequence effect was found. Average claims when the
penalty/reward value was high in Part B were larger given that the penalty/reward was
low in Part A than average claims for the same high penalty/reward when it appeared in
Part A. Similarly, average claims for low penalty/reward values were smaller when
following a high penalty/reward.
The experimental evidence is consistent with Basu' s original clam that there is a
"rational" basis for rejecting the Nash equilibrium when the penalty/reward is small.
Although Basu did not explicitly consider other penalty/reward levels, he used a relatively
small R value when proposing the traveler's dilemma. The evidence also supports the
N ash equilibrium prediction for high levels of R. This is consistent with the static
analysis of the game when only two claims are considered. Recall that the magnitude of
the penalty/reward parameter should not in theory have any impact on the Nash
equilibrium; therefore, evidence of play inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium is
observed by CG.

Hypotheses
HI: Introducing social context in the form of the original the original traveler's dilemma

parable will cause the average claims to deviate from the Nash equilibrium even in the
face of a penalty/reward which is sufficiently high to induce the Nash equilibrium in the
absence of social context.
The CG study established some important characteristics of the traveler's
dilemma but left open some interesting avenues for further study. Consider the traveler's
dilemma as if it were a real situation. If both travelers know the actual purchase price of

9

the souvenir it seems reasonable to postulate that it might induce a non-equilibrium
"sticky point." The sticky point could occur for moral reasons (fairness, honesty, etc.) or
as a means of tacit coordination. The purchase price is a sunk cost and, as such, should
be completely discounted. Although the purchase price is strategically irrelevant it could
be psychologically relevant. Even supposing that the price is not known, would the mere
fact that the other person is a fellow traveler (let alone a close friend or relative) reduce
the incentive to undercut? Does the Nash equilibrium hold up against contextual
incentives when the penalty/reward level is large enough to induce it absent such context?
Omitting the social context may eliminate critical information. The social context
is one of the reasons that the parable version of the traveler's dilemma is so successful in
highlighting the inappropriateness of the Nash equilibrium. Introducing it may reveal that
the Nash equilibrium is a poor prediction of actual play regardless of the magnitude of the
penalty/reward.
H2 :
If the penalty parameter is eliminated it will still hold that average claims are
inversely related to the reward parameter. The penalty parameter intensifies the effect of
the reward.
To reiterate, the Nash equilibrium in the traveler's dilemma is induced by the
reward. That is, a reward is both a necessary and a sufficient condition to drive the
eqUilibrium to the minimum claim value. A penalty is not only unnecessary it is
insufficient to drive the equilibrium to the minimum. The best response to any belief
about another traveler's claim when there is only a penalty is simply the other traveler's
claim. In contrast the Nash equilibrium is unchanged when there is only a reward.
Imposing a symmetric penalty is somewhat akin to doubling the reward. I believe that
penalties merely accelerate the learning process.

10

Is average claim level still inversely related to the reward parameter? If so, will
the reward alone be sufficient incentive, in practice, to drive play to the Nash
equilibrium? It is possible that the penalty serves as a reinforcement mechanism,
effectively speeding the rate of convergence. On the other hand, its inclusion may blur or
shift subjects' focus away from the strategically critical elements of the traveler's
dilemma.

IV. Methodology

The instructions for this experiment are based in large measure on the instructions
developed by CG. Four experimental sessions were conducted using 10 participants each
session. A separate set of instructions was used for each session. Four treatments were
used (with and without social context and with and without the penalty parameter, see
Table 2). Social context was introduced by including the original traveler's dilemma
parable in the experiment's instructions. Penalties were removed simply by omitting
those portions of the instructions that described how and when penalties were to be
administered. When the penalty was present it was symmetrical to the reward.

Table 2
Treatment I

Treatment II

No Social Context Social Context
Penalty
Session I
Session"
No Penalty
Session III
Session IV

~----------~~~~~--~

Subjects were recruited from the student body at Oberlin College to participate in
a "decision making experiment." Average earnings were advertised as $8.00 per student
of which $3.00 was guaranteed for attending. The duration of the experiment was
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advertised as approximately one hour, although all four sessions ran between 10 and 20
minutes over.
Upon arrival, subjects were assigned to evenly separated seats facing exterior
classroom walls to discourage subject interaction. Subjects completed a ring test prior to
beginning the traveler's dilemma experiment. 13 The ring test measures predisposition
towards cooperation and was included in association with an ongoing study by Professor
Robert Piron. I do' not make use of the data collected by the ring test in this paper.
Following the ring test the appropriate instructions for a particular session were
read (see Appendix A) and any questions were answered prior to proceeding. Subjects
were asked to submit integer-valued claims between 80 and 120 laboratory dollars.
Laboratory dollars are an artificial currency which was converted to U.S. dollars at the
end of each session using an exchange rate designed to exhaust the budget for each
session. The total budget for each session was $80.00 of which $50.00 was awarded
according to the following equation.

US_DolIacEarnngs=

50
: Total_Labortory_Dollar_Earnings

·Individual_Laboratory_DolIar_Eamings

Decision sheets were collected after each round (see Appendix B for a sample
decision sheet) and subjects randomly paired. Lab assistants calculated and recorded the
"other person's claim," "lower claim," "penalty or reward," and "earnings" in the
appropriate column before returning the decision sheets. 14 Earnings were calculated by
taking the lower of the two claims and adding the appropriate reward for the lower

13 Liebrand, W. B. G. "The Effect of Social Motive, Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in an Nperson Multi-Stage Mixed Motive Game." European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, pp. 230-264.
14 Sessions III and IV had instead a column labeled "reward."
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claimant and subtracting a symmetrical penalty (when applicable) to the higher claimant.
An exit survey was administered following the final round of play while earnings were
calculated (Appendix C).
Sessions consisted of two parts (Parts A and B) lasting ten rounds each. During
each round, subjects participated in a traveler's dilemma with different, randomly
selected subjects. Session II assigned, to all subjects, a low penalty/reward (10 laboratory
dollars) during Part A and a high penalty/reward (80 laboratory dollars) during Part B.
The order was reversed during Session N where Part A became the high reward and Part
B the low reward. This was the sole difference between Parts A and B for these two
sessions; however, subjects did not know this fact in advance. Subjects were informed
only that Part A would be followed by "another decision making experiment." Session I
assigned a high penalty/reward for both parts and Session III assigned a low reward for
both parts as a control. The reversal of penalty/reward levels allowed sequence effects to
be isolated. CG were able to cancel sequence effects directly (across sessions) since their
instructions remained constant for all sessions. It is possible to isolate sequence effects
across sessions even though the instructions changed because regression analysis is used.
Subjects were explicitly informed that the person with whom they were to be randomly
matched always faced an identical penalty/reward structure.
The issue of saliency, or whether the reward generates the appropriate utility in
subjects, arises when experiments are conducted using artificial monetary units. It has
been theorized that using a laboratory currency can "mask or even dilute financial

13
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incentives,,15 because individuals don't fully grasp the underlying value. Holt and
Douglas remark that "it is probably prudent to denominate laboratory earnings in cash,
unless the researcher has a specific design motivation for using a laboratory currency.,,16
I believe that when subjects clearly understand that an increase in laboratory
dollar earnings translates into a proportional increase in monetary compensation the
underlying financial incentives remain intact. This is particularly germane in an
experimental setting because subjects are solicited to attend using monetary incentives. I
feel that it is reasonable to assume that those who attend will pursue earning-maximizing
behavior to the extent that they understand the reward structure. It is therefore incumbent
upon the experimenter to explain carefully what the use of a laboratory currency implies.
I concede that when the exchange rate is unknown an individual may not know the
marginal benefit achieved for expending effort in an attempt to earn more laboratory
dollars; however, when subjects attempt to maximize their earnings, larger laboratory
dollar denominated rewards should evoke greater effort. I found it necessary to utilize this
method to avoid exceeding my budget.
It is important to note that I have assumed that individuals who were exposed to
the traveler's dilemma parable did actually consider it when making their decisions. Any
conclusions that are made about the effect of adding social context hinges on this

(

assumption. Although reasons exist why this assumption may not hold I do not believe
that it is feasible to conduct this experiment is such a way that this problem is

15 Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A. Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
pp. 26.
16 Ibid. pp. 26.
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circumvented. Moreover, this technique has been used before to investigate similar
issues.
By default the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest procedure by
which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated. The use of the method
relies on the assumption that people often know how they would behave in actual
situations, and on the further assumption that the subject would have no special reason to
disguise their true preferences. I7

The above assumption may be violated if individuals have an incentive to ignore
the hypothetical situation because they feel it may affect their earnings. They may
be capable of ignoring the social context in a hypothetical situation whereas they
could not in a real-world situation. This could disguise their true preference. I
feel that if experimental evidence is found that social context, introduced as a
hypothetical, can influence subjects' decisions then the effect on real-world
decisions where actual social context is present may be greater (the contextual
incentives are likely to be more immediate).
CG used a continuous claim space in their experiment. I elected to use a
discrete claim space instead. The two motivations for this choice were (1) an
acknowledgement of human proclivities and (2) simplicity. Individuals often
round to a somewhat arbitrary degree for simplification. By specifying the
minimum degree to which rounding was allowed to take place I hope to have
eliminated some "noise" in my data. Examination of the CG data reveal when
given the opportunity subjects do not consistently specify their claim to the
maximum degree possible. In addition, the use of integers reduced the difficulty
of the earnings calculations and diminished the chance of human error.

17 Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. "
Econometrica, March 1979,47(2), pp. 265 .
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v.

Data

The data are summarized in Chart 1. Claims are averaged across subjects
and plotted by round. The discontinuity between Rounds 10 and 11 emphasizes
the treatment change (if any) between Part A and Part B. Each session is labeled
with its treatment variables for clarity. For example, Session I, Part A labeled
NSC P=80 indicates no social context, penalty present, and a high reward level
while Session IV, Part B labeled SC R=lO indicates social context, no penalty
present, and a low reward level.
It appears that the general result of the CG experiment (average claim is
inversely proportional to penalty/reward level) holds for Sessions I and ill.
Session ill immediately converges toward the maximum allowed claim and
remains high throughout the session. Average claims in Session I, while much
lower, do not converge completely to the Nash equilibrium. (Recall that the Nash
equilibrium response is 80 for all sessions.) However, when individual averages
are examined (see Table 3) it is apparent that Subject 3 and Subject 4 have
unusually high averages. Further, both subjects exhibit non-strategic behavior,
that is, repeated submission of the same losing claim, during most or all of their
responses. 18 When these responses are removed the average drops approximately
20 dollars per round and lies much closer to the Nash equilibrium (see Chart 2).
When the outliers are removed the cross subject average drops from 118.0 to
99.84 and the standard deviation of average claims drops from 39.3 to 8.8.

16
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Unfortunately, this does not remove interaction effects that could continue to bias
the average upwards and contribute to the greater degree of fluctuation.

Table 3
Subject 1
Subject 2
Subject 3
Subject 4
Subject 5
Subject 6
Subject 7
Subject 8
Subject 9
Subject 10
Average
SD

Per Person Claim Average by Session
Session I Session II Session III Session IV
193.85
129.35
105.5
103.5
170.75
148.6
112.45
105.95
186.95
131.65
200
120.05
98.5
180.75
181.4
142.65
101.75
188.6
87
84.5
133.65
194.55
91.4
88.5
101.5
191.25
106.25
98
184.05
153.25
105.05
124.9
84.65
192.3
161
97.55
194.85
113.05
93.55
107.75
187.79
119.6
118.02
113.68
23.01
7.6
39.33
23.98

One simple method that may eliminate the upward bias is to make use of
the reinforcement learning theory considered by CG. 19 The basic idea is that
subjects' claims in round t should move in the direction of the best response to the
claim of the person with whom they were matched in round t-1. This implies that
eliminating subjects' claims which immediately follow a round in which they
were matched with Subject 3 or Subject 4 will remove some of the interaction
effect and consequently reduce the average and the variance. The cross-subject
average drops to 95.4 and the standard deviation of average claims to 6.2 (see
Chart 3). In addition to the issue that some subjects may not follow this pattern,
this technique is also imperfect in that it only accounts for first order shocks.

18 Subject 3 submitted 200 during all 20 rounds. Subject 4 submitted 200 for all rounds in Part A and 190
or greater during 6 out of 10 rounds in Part B. Subject 4 only submitted the lower claim 4 times.
19 Selten R., and Buchta, J. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid
Functions" University of Bonn Discussion PaperB-270, 1994 as used in Capra, Monica M., Goeree, Jacob
K., et al. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?" UnpUblished, September 1997.
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There is a clear, symmetric reversal of average claim between Parts A and
B of Sessions IT and IV i.e., when the magnitude of the penalty/reward parameter
is allowed to change. This is also consistent with the general result that average
claims are inversely related to the magnitude of the penalty/reward. When the
penalty/reward parameter is large (Session Ill, Session IT, Part B and Session IV,
Part A) average claims are uniformly lower than average claims for which the
penalty/reward parameter is small (Session I, Session IT, Part A and Session IV,
Part B). The fact that the magnitude of the reversal between Parts A and B of
Sessions IT and IV is roughly symmetrical is very intriguing. Unfortunately, other
parameters are changing and it is difficult to determine what portion of the shift is
associated with the sequence effect and what portion is due to the change from
penalty and reward to reward only.
Notice that the reversal occurs in Session IV even though there is no
penalty. This indicates that the reward incentive is strong enough, absent a
penalty, to achieve the expected results. Possible evidence that the penalty/reward
parameter may serve to reinforce the reward, as previously suggested, is shown in
Sessions IT and IV. A priori, one would expect the first rounds of Session IV, Part
B to be lower than Session IT, Part A due to sequence effects yet this is not true.
Taking the average claims for which the penalty/reward parameter is small
as a group exposes the fact that average claims are much lower when social
context is present (Sessions IT, Part A and Session Ill, Part B). This is precisely
the opposite of what I anticipated. I hypothesized that introducing social context
would increase the incentive to cooperate thus making the expected effect

18

positive. It is less clear what effect social context has on average claims for which
the penalty/reward is high. It appears to decrease the level of average claims on
Chart 1, have no effect on Chart 2, and increase the level on Chart 3.
I am unable to estimate numerically or construct confidence intervals for
conclusions drawn from the graphical representation of the data. Nonetheless, it
is observable that average claims are inversely related to penalty/reward parameter
and the reward alone, the penalty reinforces the reward, social context has a
negative impact, and the sequence effect appears to be symmetrical. To accurately
separate the effects of the treatment variables I must now tum to regression
analysis. On a positive note, the main characteristics of the data are consistent
with previous work (see Chart 4 for a direct comparison).

VI. Regression Results

The first model that I consider is the simplest. The four experimental
treatments are coded as dichotomous variables and then regressed on individual
claims. The penalty/reward parameter is decomposed into two parts: PENALTY,
indicating the presence of a symmetric penalty, and LEVEL, indicating the
magnitude of the reward. The sequence effect can be measured as two separate
effects or it can be combined into one variable. Using either specification is
acceptable. The only significant difference is the expected sign on the coefficient.
The coefficient on the dichotomous variable for the sequence effect going from a
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low initial penalty/reward to a high penalty/reward should be positive. 2o The
opposite holds for the sign on the coefficient for the sequence effect going from a
low initial penalty/reward to a high penalty/reward. The sequence effect is
computed both ways during the first regression as a check. Table 4 explains how
the dichotomous variables are constructed. The experimental parameters are the
same for all subjects in a given part; therefore, the dummy variables are always
the same for all subjects in a given part. Lastly a dummy variable is created in
order to account for the possible upward bias caused by interaction with Subject 3
or4.

Table 4

Explanation of Dichotomous Variables
Session I
Session II
Session III
Session IV
Part A
Part B Part A
Part B Part A L Part B Part A I Part B

SOCIAL CONTEXT
LEVEL
PENALTY
SEQUENCE H-L
SEQUENCE L-H
SEQUENCE_EFFECT

o
1
1

o
o
o

0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
000
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
1
0
1
0
000
0
0
0
001
0
0
-1

SOCIAL CONTEXT = 1 if social context is present
LEVEL = 1if the penalty/reward level is high
PENALTV = 1 if there is a penalty
SEQUENCE H_L = 1if the penalty/reward goes from high (80) to low (10)
SEQUENCE L_H = 1if the penalty/reward goes from low (10) to high (80)
SEQUENCE_EFFECT = 1 if the sequence effect goes from high to low, -1
if the effect goes from low to high, and 0 if there is no change between
Part A and B
Bias = 1 if the subject was paired with Subject 3 or 4 in the prior round

CLAIMit=a 0+ ~ l·SociaIContext+ ~ 2·Penalty + ~ 3-Level+ ~ 4·SequenceEffect + ~ S·Bias

20 This may sound contrary to what was previously stated about sequence effects. The confusion is a matter
of semantics, keep in mind that a low penalty/reward induces high average claims.
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Included observations: 800
Variable

e

SOCIAL_CONTEXT
PENALTY
LEVEL
SEQUENCE_EFFECT
BIAS
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

e
SOCIAL_CONTEXT
PENALTY
LEVEL
SEQUENCE_L_H
SEQUENCE_H_L
BIAS
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

183.92
-35.64
-26.12
-37.17
12.46
7.40
0.42
37.46
1113889.00
0.82

2.48
2.71
3.79
3.26
3.26
6.96

74.11
-13.13
-6.89
-11.41
3.83
1.06

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.288
134.770
49.220
117.158
0.000

183.92
-35.62
-26.12
-37.17
12.44
-12.49
7.40
0.42
37.48
1113889.00
0.82

Mean dependent var
S.D.dependentvar
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

2.48
3.30
3.79
3.26
4.97
4.97
6.97

74.06
-10.80
-6.88
-11.41
2.50
-2.5.1
1.06

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependentvar
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.013
0.012
0.288
134.770
49.220
97.508
0.000

The penalty, level, and sequence effect coefficients are all highly
significant and have the expected sign. The negative coefficient on penalty is
consistent with the supposition that the penalty reinforces the reward-driven
incentive to submit low claims. The negative coefficient on level reinforces the
conclusion that claim level is inversely related to the magnitude of the reward.
The low to high and high to low sequence effects are roughly symmetrical, posses
the expected signs, and are significant at about the 10% level. When the sequence
effect is consolidated into a single variable it becomes highly significant.
It remains puzzling that social context has a highly significant, negative

impact. Although I do not have a definitive explanation of why social context did
not contribute to cooperation, subsequent reflection has yielded one possible
explanation. "Social context" is an ambiguous term representing a host of
personal and societal influences. I believe that the crux of the problem is the
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assumption of the type of social context that was introduced. I implicitly assumed
that it would evoke a feeling of solidarity among subjects?l It is possible that
introducing the parable caused subjects to scrutinize their fellow traveler's
position more carefully and as a result introduced what I will call the "specter of
competition." The manner in which subjects interacted coupled with the parable
may have given rise to feelings of mistrust. Instead of considering their fellow
traveler as a guiltless human being confronting a similar misfortune, subjects may
have cast the person with whom they were matched in the role of a competitor for
the same reward. I do not present this as a conclusive explanation although it
does explain why social context did not have as much effect when the
penalty/reward parameter was large. In this case sufficient incentive to motivate
competitive behavior already exists. Disregarding the counterintuitive negative
sign, I can conclude (un surprisingly) that social context does matter but that the
exact nature of the social context is not easily determined.
The coefficient on bias indicates that interaction with the Subjects 3 and 4
did have a positive effect on claims in the following round. The coefficient is
small relative to its standard error and therefore it is only significant at the 30%
level. The model can explain nearly half of the variation in the claim data

-,

(R - = .42). Unfortunately, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is

positive, first order serial correlation. The presence of serial correlation implies
that the standard errors are biased downward and the estimated coefficients are no
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Especially given that the subjects are Oberlin students ..
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longer efficient. The basic specification is next computed using a first order
autoregressive correction technique.
Included observations: 799 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
Variable

C
SOCIAL_CONTEXT
PENALTY
LEVEL
SEQUENCE_EFFECT
BIAS
AR(1)
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat
Inverted AR Roots

Coefficient

Std. Error

181.29
-34.21
-28.28
-32.22
10.40
16.42
0.60

4.84
5.20
6.87
4.50
6.19
4.88
0.03

0.63
30.15
720100.10
2.26
0.60

t-Statistic

37.46
-6.57
-4.12
-7.16
1.68
3.36
20.96

Mean dependent var
S.D.dependentvar
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.093
0.001
0.000

134.776
49.251
222.822
0.000

Correcting for first order serial correlation does not drastically change the
estimated coefficients. The upward bias is actually more significant although the
sequence effect is now only significant at the 10% level. A substantial
-7

improvement has occurred in the explanatory power of the model ( R - = .63 ).
Ideally I would now like to include dichotomous variables for each subject
and round in order to separate out the person and time effects. Unfortunately I
cannot include every tenth dichotomous person variable because this creates
perfect multicolinerity. I chose to eliminate the first subject from each session.
The interpretation of the coefficient on the person becomes the amount by which
Subject; differs from the first subject in that session. The first time round is, of
course, omitted to avoid a similar linear dependency problem. The coefficient on
the time dummy has a straightforward interpretation; the amount by which round;
differs from Round 1. The regression results are fairly lengthy due to the number
of explanatory variables and are contained in Appendix D. Once again the
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regression is first estimated using ordinary least squares and then the correction
for serial correlation is applied.

CLAM it=a 0+ J3 l ·SociaIContext+ J3 2 ,Penalty + J3 3·Level + J3 4· SequenceEffect + J3 S·Bias
... + J3 6·Subject2 t+ .. · J3 40·Subject39 t+ J3 41,Period2 i+'" J3 S9·Period20i

The person effects are not terribly interesting in and of themselves; rather
they serve to control for the idiosyncrasies of particular subjects. It is
confirmation to note that the coefficients for Subjects 3 and 4 are significant,
positive, and larger than all other person coefficients. This reinforces the
conclusion that a substantial amount of their behavior is exogenously determined.
The time variables illustrate an interesting trend. During the initial rounds
the coefficients are mostly negative but largely insignificant. After Round l3 the
coefficients are uniformly negative and, with the exception of Round 16,
,

, I
I ,

,,

significant at the 11% level or less. (Round 16 is unusual because of an unrelated,

I:
I

simultaneous occurrence of high claims in Sessions I and II.). This pattern
evinces a tendency towards negative convergence. Learning that drives play
toward a "sticky" level that is closer to the Nash equilibrium than the initial round
is on possible explanation for this phenomenon. There is some ambiguity because
the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated positive serial correlation.

VII. Conclusion

Nash equilibrium solutions are a powerful, commonly accepted manner by
which game theoretic questions are answered. This technique, like any other, has
its shortcomings. There are games in which the Nash equilibrium solution is
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counterintuitive and therefore a poor predictor of actual behavior. The traveler' s
dilemma is one such game.
The description of the traveler's dilemma given by Basu contains both a
penalty parameter and social context. The penalty parameter is unnecessary and
insufficient to derive the Nash equilibrium. Social context, while strategically
irrelevant, constitutes an important part of the motivation in the parable version of
the traveler's dilemma.
I have found that when only a reward is present the incentive to submit
lower claims is preserved. The presence of a penalty does have a reinforcing
effect. Inducing a predetermined brand of social context is a complex matter.
Social context influences our daily decisions in subtle and often unrecognized
ways. The effect of social context is undeniable ex post facto but predicting the
precise nature in which different groups of individuals will perceive and react to
any set of social circumstances is perilous indeed. I erroneously assumed that I
could control the nature of the social context that was introduced.
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Appendix A
Instructions for Session I
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described.

Earnings
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately
followed by another decision making experiment. In each round, you will be randomly
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. At the beginning of
each round, you will choose a number or "claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars.
(Laboratory dollars will be converted into real currency at the end of the experiment
using an exchange rate determined by the experimenter. This ensures that the budget is
not exceeded. However, we will exhaust the entire budget for this experiment. The
average amount earned will equal the budget divided by the number of participants
present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory dollar will be worth less than $1 but,
since the total amount of money to be distributed is fixed, the more laboratory dollars you
earn the more cash you will receive at the end of the experiment.) Claims will be made
by writing any amount between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. The person
with whom you are matched will also make a claim between and including 80 and 200
laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then you and the other person each will
receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not equal, then each of you will receive the
lower of the two claims. In addition, the person who makes the lower claim will earn a
reward and the person with the higher claim will pay a penalty. The reward and penalty
for you and the person with whom you are matched will always be the same. For
example, you could earn an amount that equals the lower of the two claims, plus an 80
laboratory dollar reward if you are the person making the lower claim, or the lower of the
two claims minus an 80 laboratory dollar penalty if you are the person making the higher
claim. There is no penalty or reward if the two claims are exactly equal, in which case
each person receives what they claimed.
Example 1:

Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory
dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars.
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim,
therefore, you will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2
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$6. The person with whom you are matched will receive the lower claim
plus the reward or $8 + $2 =$10.
Example 2:

Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory dollars,
and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars.
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10. The person with whom you are
matched will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 = $6.

Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are
determined?
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Record of Results
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A.
Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other
person's claim," "lower claim," penalty or reward (if any), and "your earnings." The
amount in the column labeled penalty or reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will
be added to or subtracted from the lower claim to determine your earnings. You begin by
writing down your own claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim
must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200
laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82,
... , 199,200).
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets.
We will then match each of you with another person using computer generated random
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other
person's claim, the lower claim, the penalty or reward, and your earnings in the relevant
columns of your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and
record your decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly
match you with another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, penalty or
reward, and earnings in your decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be
repeated for a total of ten rounds.
Final Remarks
At the end of today's session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in
U.S, dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment.
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800·r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to
discuss them with anyone.
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During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you
have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please
raise your hand now.
Instructions (part B)

A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will
be identical to. As before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in each
round, you will be randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a
claim. You will receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other
person's claim minus a penalty if you have the higher claim and plus a reward if you
have the lower claim. There is no penalty or reward if you claim the same amount as the
person with whom you are matched. Claims must be greater than or equal to 80
laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the claim may be
any integer amount in this range.
Instructions for Session II

You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described.
Earnings
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately
followed by another decision making experiment. In each round, you will be randomly
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. You are asked to
consider the following hypothetical scenario. You and the person that you are matched
with have just returned from a vacation. During this vacation you purchased identical
souvenirs from the same store. These souvenirs were destroyed during your flight by the
airline. You are asked by the airline claim agent to submit a claim in order to be
compensated for your loss. Because you did not purchase special insurance for the
damaged items the maximum amount that you can receive is 200 dollars and it is well
known that the airline does not dispute claims of 80 dollars and below. If you both
submit the same claim you receive the amount of your claim as compensation. However
the claim agent, in an effort to prevent inflated claims, stipulates that if either of you
submits a claim which is lower than the other's then both of you will receive the smaller
claim. In addition, the traveler who submits the lower claim will receive a reward for
their presumed honesty and the traveler who submits the higher claim will be penalized
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for their presumed dishonesty. At the beginning of each round, you will choose a number
or "claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. (Laboratory dollars will be converted
into real currency at the end of the experiment using an exchange rate determined by the
experimenter. This ensures that the budget is not exceeded. However, we will exhaust
the entire budget for this experiment. The average amount earned will equal the budget
divided by the number of participants present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory
dollar will be worth less than $1 but, since the total amount of money to be distributed is
fixed, the more laboratory dollars you earn the more cash you will receive at the end of
the experiment.) Claims will be made by writing any amount between and including 80
and 200 laboratory dollars. The person with whom you are matched will also make a
claim between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then
you and the other person each will receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not
equal, then each of you will receive the lower of the two claims. In addition, the person
who makes the lower claim will earn a reward and the person with the higher claim will
pay a penalty. The reward and penalty for you and the person with whom you are
matched will always be the same. For example, you could earn an amount that equals the
lower of the two claims, plus an 80 laboratory dollar reward if you are the person making
the lower claim, or the lower of the two claims minus an 80 laboratory dollar penalty if
you are the person making the higher claim. There is no penalty or reward if the two
claims are exactly equal, in which case each person receives what they claimed.
Example 1:
,.,

Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory
dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars.
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim,
therefore, you will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 =
$6. The person with whom you are matched will receive the lower claim
plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10 ..
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Example 2:

Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory dollars,
and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars.
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 =~10. The person with whom you are
matched will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 = $6.

Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are
determined?

Record of Results
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A.
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Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other
person's claim," "lower claim," penalty or reward (if any), and "your earnings." The
amount in the column labeled penalty or reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will
be added to or subtracted from the lower claim to determine your earnings. You begin by
writing down your own claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim
must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200
laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82,
... , 199,200).
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets.
We will then match each of you with another person using computer generated random
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other
person's claim, the lower claim, the penalty or reward, and your earnings in the relevant
columns of your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and
record your decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly
match you with another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, penalty or
reward, and earnings in your decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be
repeated for a total of ten rounds.
Final Remarks
At the end of to day's session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in
U.S. dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment.
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800·r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to
discuss them with anyone.

During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you
have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please
raise your hand now.
Instructions (part B)

A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will
be identical to part A, with the exception that the reward and penalty amounts have been
changed. As before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in each round,
you will be randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a claim. You
will receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other person's claim
minus a penalty if you have the higher claim and plus a reward if you have the lower
claim. There is no penalty or reward if you claim the same amount as the person with
whom you are matched. Claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars
and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount
in this range.
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Instructions for Session III
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in caSh at the
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described.
Earnings
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately
followed by another decision making experiment. In each round, you will be randomly
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. At the beginning of
each round, you will choose a number or "claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars.
(Laboratory dollars will be converted into real currency at the end of the experiment
using an exchange rate determined by the experimenter. This ensures that the budget is
not exceeded. However, we will exhaust the entire budget for this experiment. The
average amount earned will equal the budget divided by the number of participants
present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory dollar will be worth less than $1 but,
since the total amount of money to be distributed is fixed, the more laboratory dollars you
earn the more cash you will receive at the end of the experiment.) Claims will be made
by writing any amount between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. The person
with whom you are matched will also make a claim between and including 80 and 200
laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then you and the other person each will
receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not equal, then each of you will receive the
lower of the two claims. In addition, the person who makes the lower claim will earn a
reward. The reward for you and the person with whom you are matched will always be
the same. For example, you could earn an amount that equals the lower of the two
claims, plus an 80 laboratory dollar reward if you are the person making the lower claim,
or the lower of the two claims if you are the person making the higher claim. There is no
reward if the two claims are exactly equal, in which case each person receives what they
claimed.
Example 1;

Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory
dollars.
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim,
therefore, you will receive the lower claim or $8. The person with whom
you are matched will receive the lower claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 =
$10.
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Example 2:

Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory
dollars.
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 =$10. The person with whom you are
matched will receive the lower claim or $8.

Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are
determined?
Record of Results
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A.
Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other
person's claim," "lower claim," "reward" (if any), and "your earnings." The amount in
the column labeled reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will be added to the lower
claim to determine the lower claimant's earnings. You begin by writing down your own
claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim must be greater than or
equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the
claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82, ... , 199,200).
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets.
We will·then match each of you with another person using computer generated random
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other
person's claim, the lower claim, the reward, and your earnings in the relevant columns of
your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and record your
decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly match you with
another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, reward, and earnings in your
decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be repeated for a total of ten rounds.
Final Remarks
At the end of today' s session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in
U.S. dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment.
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800·r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to
discuss them with anyone.

During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you
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have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please
raise your hand now.

Instructions (part B)
A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will
be identical to part A. As before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in
each round, you will be randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a
claim. You will receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other
person's claim plus a reward if you have the lower claim. There is no reward if you
claim the same amount as the person with whom you are matched or if you make the
higher claim. Claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than
or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range.
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You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described.

Earnings
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately
followed by another decision making experiment In each round, you will be randomly
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. You are asked to
consider the following hypothetical scenario. You and the person that you are matched
with have just returned from a vacation. During this vacation you purchased identical
souvenirs from the same store. These souvenirs were destroyed during your flight by the
airline. You are asked by the airline claim agent to submit a claim in order to be
compensated for your loss. Because you did not purchase special insurance for the
damaged items the maximum amount that you can receive is 200 dollars and it is well
known that the airline does not dispute claims of 80 dollars and below. If you both
submit the same claim you receive the amount of your claim as compensation. However,
the claim agent, in an effort to prevent inflated claims, stipulates that if either of you
submits a claim which is lower than the other's then both of you will receive the smaller
claim. In addition, the traveler who submits the lower claim will receive a reward for
their presumed honesty. At the beginning of each round, you will choose a number or
"claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. (Laboratory dollars will be converted
into real currency at the end of the experiment using an exchange rate determined by the
experimenter. This ensures that the budget is not exceeded. However, we will exhaust
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the entire budget for this experiment. The average amount earned will equal the budget
divided by the number of participants present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory
dollar will be worth less than $1 but, since the total amount of money to be distributed is
fixed, the more laboratory dollars you earn the more cash you will receive at the end of
the experiment.) Claims will be made by writing any amount between and including 80
and 200 laboratory dollars. The person with whom you are matched will also make a
claim between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then
you and the other person each will receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not
equal, then each of you will receive the lower of the two claims. In addition, the person
who makes the lower claim will earn a reward. The reward for you and the person with
whom you are matched will always be the same. For example, you could earn an amount
that equals the lower of the two claims, plus an 80 laboratory dollar reward if you are the
person making the lower claim, or simply the lower of the two claims if you are the
person making the higher claim. There is no reward if the two claims are exactly equal,
in which case each person receives what they claimed.
Example 1:

Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory
dollars.
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim,
therefore, you will receive the lower claim or $8. The person with whom
you are matched will receive the lower claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 =
$10.

Example 2:

Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory
dollars.
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10. The person with whom you are
matched will receive the lower claim or $8.

Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are
determined?
Record of Results
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A.
Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other
person's claim," "lower claim," "reward" (if any), and "your earnings." The amount in
the column labeled reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will be added to the lower
claim to determine the lower claimant's earnings. You begin by writing down your own
claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim must be greater than or

34

equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the
claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82, ... , 199,200).
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets.
We will then !patch each of you with another person using computer generated random
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other
person's claim, the lower claim, the reward, and your earnings in the relevant columns of
your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and record your
decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly match you with
another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, reward, and earnings in y~>ur
decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be repeated for a total of ten rounds.

Final Remarks
At the end of today' s session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in
U.S. dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment.
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800'r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to
discuss them with anyone.
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During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you
have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please
raise your hand now.
Instructions (part B)
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A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will
be identical to part A, with the exception that the reward amounts have been changed. As
before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in each round, you will be
randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a claim. You will
receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other person's claim plus a
reward if you have the lower claim. There is no reward if you claim the same amount as
the person with whom you are matched or if you make the higher claim. Claims must be
greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory
dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range.
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Appendix B

Part A
Choose a claim that is a
whole number greater
than or equal to 80 and
less than or equal to
200
Period
1
2

Your Claim

Subject:

These columns will be filled out by the experimenters.

Penalty: -$10
Other Person's Claim Lower Claim Reward: +$10 Your Earnings

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10

36

Appendix C
Subject:_ _

Exit Survey

1) Do you feel that you understood the instructions?
Yes

No

2) How much did you believe that you would earn (in U.S. dollars)?

3) What year are you?
1st Year
2nd Year 1-----1
3rd Year
4th Year t - - - - - I
5th Year

......._ - - - - '

4) Briefly describe your thought process prior to your first claim in Part A.
i.
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5) What is your major?

I

6) Did you consciously round the amount that you claimed? If so, what units did you
use for rounding (by even numbers, by fives, tens, etc.)?

7) What is you annual family income?
<$20,000
>$20,000 but <$50,000
>$50,000 but <$100,000
1-----1
>$100,000
Don't Know

8) What did you think this experiment is about?
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AppendixD
(sorry, not electronic)
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Appendix E
Included observations: 800
Variable
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SOCIAL_CONTEXT
PENALTY
LEVEL
SEQUENCE_EFFECT
BIAS
SUBJECT_2
SUBJECT_3
SUBJECT_4
SUBJECT_5
SUBJECT_6
SUBJECTJ
SUBJECT_8
SUBJECT_9
SUBJECT_10
SUBJECT_12
SUBJECT_13
SUBJECT_14
SUBJECT_15
SUBJECT_16
SUBJECT_17
SUBJECT_18
SUBJECL19
SUBJECT_20
SUBJECT_22
SUBJECT_23
SUBJECT_24
SUBJECT_25
SUBJECT_26
SUBJECT_27
SUBJECT_28
SUBJECT_29
SUBJECT_30
SUBJECT_32
SUBJECT_33
SUBJECT_34
SUBJECT_35
SUBJECT_36
SUBJECT_37
SUBJECT_38
SUBJECT_39
Period_2
Period_3
Period_4
Period_5
Period_6
PeriodJ
Period_8
Period_9
Period_10
Period_11
Period_12
Period_13
Period_14
Period_15
Period_16
Period_17
Period_18
Period_19
Period 20
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient
191.18
-31.66
-43.11
-31.16
24.93
21.23
-2.74
86.93
68.33
-27.13
-22.73
-10.00
-10.14
-16.58
-22.70
11.08
25.18
47.78
-10.37
-31 .30
-21 .80
5.10
41.20
-12.05
-14.47
1.73
-4.47
3.38
9.33
6.03
-1.17
7.08
9.63
10.62
-6.33
-39.48
-36.23
20.60
-11.55
40.20
-28.40
-8.21
-5.29
-5.14
-10.54
-4.51
0.54
-1 .94
-2.59
-2.29
6.20
-4.64
-6.68
-10.71
-12.56
-4.13
-11.74
-11.06
-11 .61
-12.27
0.68
28.05
582306.40
1.43

Std. Error
t-Statistic
6.98
27.40
-5.04
6.29
-6.70
6.43
2.74
-11.38
2.99
8.33
3.97
5.34
-0.33
8.34
10.44
8.33
8.21
8.33
-3.26
8.33
-2.73
8.33
-1.20
8.36
-1.22
8.34
-1.99
8.33
-2.72
8.36
8.33
1.33
3.02
8.33
5.74
8.33
-1 .25
8.33
-2.49
12.55
-1.74
12.55
0.41
12.55
3.28
12.55
-0.96
12.55
-1.74
8.33
0.21
8.33
-0.54
8.33
0.41
8.33
1.12
8.33
0.72
8.33
-0.14
8.33
0.85
8.33
1.16
8.33
1.28
8.33
-0.76
8.33
-4.74
8.33
-4.35
8.33
2.32
8.87
-1.30
8.87
4.53
8.87
-3.20
8.87
-1.31
6.28
-0.84
6.28
-0.82
6.28
-1 .68
6.28
-0.72
6.28
0.09
6.28
-0.31
6.28
-0.41
6.28
-0.36
6.28
0.99
6.27
-0.74
6.28
-1.06
6.27
-1.71
6.28
-2.00
6.27
-0.66
6.27
-1.87
6.28
-1.76
6.28
-1 .85
6.28
-1 .95
6.29
Mean dependent var
S.D.dependentvar
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
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Prob.
0.060
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.742
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.007
0.232
0.224
0.047
0.007
0.184
0.003
0.000
0.214
0.013
0.083
0.685
0.001
0.337
0.083
0.835
0.592
0.685
0.263
0.469
0.888
0.396
0.248
0.203
0.447
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.193
0.000
0.001
0.191
0.400
0.414
0.094
0.473
0.932
0.758
0.681
0.716
0.323
0.461
0.287
0.088
0.046
0.511
0.062
0.079
0.065
0.051

134.770
49.220
29.151
0.000

Included observations: 799 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable

e

SOCIAL_CONTEXT
PENALTY
LEVEL
SEQUENCE_EFFECT
BIAS
SUBJECT_2
SUBJECT_3
SUBJECT_4
SUBJECT_5
SUBJECT_6
SUBJECTJ
SUBJECT_8
SUBJECT_9
SUBJECT_10
SUBJECT_12
SUBJECT_13
SUBJECT_14
SUBJECT_15
SUBJECT_16
SUBJECT_17
SUBJECT_18
SUBJECT_19
SUBJECT_20
SUBJECT_22
SUBJECT_23
SUBJECT_24
SUBJECT_25
SUBJECT_26
SUBJECT_27
SUBJECT_28
SUBJECT_29
SUBJECT_30
SUBJECT_32
SUBJECT_33
SUBJECT_34
SUBJECT_35
SUBJECT_36
SUBJECT_37
SUBJECT_38
SUBJECT_39
Period_2
Period_3
Period_4
Period_5
Period_6
PeriodJ
Period_8
Period_9
Period_10
Period_11
Period_12
Period_13
Period_14
Period_15
Period_16
Period_17
Period_18
Period_19
Period_20
AR(1)
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat
Inverted AR Roots

Coefficient
191.29
-32.91
-43.35
-30.14
22.93
21.31
-5.37
86.39
68.02
-31.34
-23.50
-10.08
-15.22
-14.78
-24.73
10.36
27.02
45.60
-8.42
-29.92
-19.10
5.39
42.95
-7.62
-14.57
-1.42
-6.47
2.93
8.36
6.63
0.04
3.12
9.06
11.14
-6.13
-38.21
-38.36
20.76
-12.53
36.79
-32.40
-7.77
-4.72
-4.53
-9.92
-3.89
1.16
-1.31
-1.96
-1.66
6.83
-4.01
-6.05
-10.09
-11.93
-3.50
-11.11
-10.44
-10.99
-11.64
0.30
0.70
26.88
533267.30
2.04
0.30

Std. Error
t-Statistic
8.49
22.54
8.42
-3.91
8.59
-5.04
3.37
-8.94
11.07
2.07
4.92
4.33
-0.48
11.07
7.71
11.20
6.07
11.21
-2.79
11.21
-2.10
11.20
-0.90
11.23
-1.36
11.21
-1.32
11.21
-2.21
11.18
0.95
10.90
2.45
11.05
4.13
11.05
-0.76
11.05
-1.80
16.63
-1.15
16.63
0.32
16.63
2.58
16.63
-0.46
16.62
-1.34
10.90
-0.13
11.03
-0.59
11.03
0.27
11.03
0.76
11.03
0.60
11.03
0.00
11.03
11.04
0.28
0.82
11.00
1.02
10.90
-0.55
11.04
-3.46
11.04
-3.47
11.04
11.77
1.76
-1.06
11.77
11.76
3.13
-2.79
11.60
-1.46
5.31
-0.78
6.05
-0.72
6.25
-1.57
6.31
-0.61
6.33
6.34
0.18
-0.21
6.34
-0.31
6.34
-0.26
6.34
1.08
6.33
-0.63
6.34
-0.96
6.33
-1.59
6.34
-1.88
6.33
-0.55
6.33
-1.76
6.31
-1.67
6.26
-1.81
6.06
-2.18
5.34
8.33
0.04
Mean dependent var
S.D.dependentvar
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
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Prob.
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.039
0.000
0.628
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.036
0.370
0.175
0.188
0.027
0.342
0.015
0.000
0.446
0.072
0.251
0.746
0.010
0.647
0.182
0.898
0.558
0.791
0.449
0.548
0.997
0.777
0.410
0.308
0.579
0.001
0.001
0.078
0.288
0.002
0.005
0.144
0.436
0.469
0.117
0.539
0.854
0.836
0.757
0.793
0.281
0.527
0.340
0.112
0.060
0.580
0.079
0.096
0.070
0.030
0.000
134.776
49.251
32.347
0.000
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